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Agenda item 11
Report of the Security Council

Security Council
Fifty-fifth year

Letter dated 17 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the pleasure of enclosing an assessment of the work of the Security Council under the Canadian Presidency in April 2000, prepared pursuant to the provisions of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 12 June 1997 (S/1997/451).

Although other members of the Security Council were consulted with regard to its contents, the assessment was prepared under the responsibility of Ambassador Robert R. Fowler, and should not necessarily be considered as representative of the views of the Security Council or its members.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the text of this letter and the attached assessment as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 11, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ross **Hynes**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 17 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Assessment of the work of the Security Council

Canada (April 2000)

This assessment of the work of the Security Council for the month of April 2000 has been prepared under the responsibility of its President during that month, Robert Fowler, Permanent Representative of Canada.

Introduction

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy, presided over six meetings, underlining Canada's political commitment to a strong, active and effective Security Council. The Council addressed a wide range of specific and thematic international peace and security issues in all regions of the world, discussing Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Iraq, Kosovo, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, as well as issues relating to sanctions and the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

Council members agreed on a demanding programme of work: 10 formal meetings (one of which was private), 14 informal consultations of the whole, and one meeting with troop contributors, chaired by the President of the Security Council, were held. During the month, the Council adopted unanimously three resolutions (the United Nations Office in Angola, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and sanctions against UNITA); issued two presidential statements (Afghanistan and the situation in the Middle East/south Lebanon); and circulated one note by the President (sanctions). The Council also decided to dispatch two missions of Security Council members to the field: the first, to Kosovo, from 27 to 29 April, was sent to review the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999); the second, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, departed on 2 May with a view to exploring with signatories to the Lusaka Agreement concrete ways to ensure the rapid and full implementation of that Agreement and of resolution 1291 (2000).

April also saw an increased Council focus on the human dimension of international security. The centrepiece of what the Presidency described as "the month of human security" was an open debate on 19 April, chaired by Mr. Axworthy, on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, at which a resolution was adopted. At that meeting, held as follow-up to the Secretary-General's report on this question, Council members and non-members alike took the opportunity to comment on the future direction of Council action to protect civilians caught up in armed conflicts around the world. In an effort to increase the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions, Mr. Axworthy also chaired an open meeting on 17 April, which allowed for a broad discussion of sanctions regimes, policy and practice, and resulted in the creation of an informal mechanism to review all aspects of the administration of United Nations sanctions.

In keeping with the theme of human security, and in order to ensure full consideration of the report of the Independent Inquiry on the Rwandan genocide, commissioned by the Secretary-General in 1999, the Council held an open meeting on 14 April, which featured a briefing by the Inquiry's chairman, the former Prime Minister of Sweden. Council members and the chairman stressed the importance of absorbing "lessons learned" from Rwanda.

Also in keeping with the theme of human security, the Presidency proposed a discussion of the Sudan to highlight the humanitarian crisis resulting from the conflict there and to lend Council backing to regional peace efforts. There was, however, no agreement among Council members on holding such a discussion and the item was not included in the programme of work.

The Presidency made available on a daily basis the Council's updated programme of work, and statements by the President to the media, on the Canadian Mission's web site (http://www.un.int/canada). The Presidency also gave detailed briefings

immediately after consultations of the whole, for countries which are not members of the Security Council. Overall, the Canadian Presidency pursued a number of initiatives from past presidencies, designed to make the Council more transparent, accountable and responsive in the way it operates.

General issues

Sanctions

To examine general issues related to United Nations sanctions regimes, the Security Council held an open meeting on 17 April. The Council's deliberations built on a discussion that morning, hosted by the International Peace Academy to launch a Canadian-sponsored study, *The Sanctions Decade*, which offered a detailed analysis of past practice.

The meeting, chaired by the Foreign Minister of Canada, opened with a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, in which he described the lessons learned from a recent review undertaken by the Secretariat, as well as from recent seminars at Bonn and Interlaken, to develop more effective and humane United Nations sanctions. The conclusions and recommendations focused on the issues of the impact of sanctions on civilians and third party States; their uneven application; and the trend towards developing "smart" sanctions, by encouraging the Council to adopt greater clarity and uniformity of language and technical terminology in resolutions, as well as specifying criteria for lifting or suspending measures. In subsequent statements by Council members and many other delegations, the majority acknowledged that the case for sanctions remained compelling, while calling for their refinement and improved effectiveness. To further the Council's work in this area, a note by the President (S/2000/319), which announced the Council's decision to establish an informal working group to develop general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions, was issued on the same day.

Civilians in armed conflict

An "Arria formula" meeting, chaired by the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, Peter van Walsum, was held on 12 April to hear briefings by senior representatives of three major non-governmental organizations (Guy Tousignant of CARE International, James Orbinski of Médecins sans frontières and Paul Smith-Lomas of Oxfam) which assist civilian populations during complex emergencies. The briefers urged Council members to separate humanitarian concerns from political considerations when mandates for United Nations missions are drafted, and stressed that greater priority should be given to the plight of internally displaced persons.

Throughout April, an informal working group of the Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict continued to meet frequently to complete the negotiation of a draft resolution. On 19 April, Mr. Axworthy chaired an open meeting of the Council to address the issue, and to adopt the draft negotiated in the working group. The Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Jakob Kellenberger, addressed the meeting. At the outset, the Secretary-General noted that last year's Council meetings (February and September 1999) and his report on this issue (S/1999/957) were being followed up with concrete steps, by both the Council and the General Assembly, and highlighted three of his earlier recommendations: the pressing requirement for a United Nations rapid deployment capability; the importance of making better use of preventive missions; and the need to improve the security of refugee camps. The President of ICRC addressed the efforts of that organization worldwide to protect vulnerable populations. Following interventions by Council members and non-members, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1296 (2000) which, *inter alia*, indicated the Council's willingness to take appropriate steps when humanitarian access is denied or when refugees and internally displaced persons are seriously threatened. The Council called for peacekeeping missions to be provided with adequate human and financial resources to protect civilians under imminent physical threat, and reaffirmed the need for special provision for women, children and other vulnerable groups in all aspects of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building.

Africa

Angola

United Nations Office in Angola. Council members met on 13 April in consultations to hear a briefing by the Adviser of the Secretary-General for

Special Assignments in Africa, Ibrahim Gambari, on recent developments in Angola, further to the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Office in Angola (S/2000/304). The Under Secretary-General provided an update on political and military events, noting that the operations of the Office had focused on humanitarian relief and human rights capacity-building. The Council then adopted unanimously resolution 1294 (2000), in which it reaffirmed its view that a continued United Nations presence in Angola could greatly contribute to the promotion of peace, national reconciliation, human rights and regional security, and extended the mandate of the Office for six months.

Sanctions against UNITA. The Security Council, chaired by the Foreign Minister of Canada, held an open meeting on 18 April, to consider the report of the Expert Panel on sanctions against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), established pursuant to resolution 1237 (1999). Noting that the sanctions were finally affecting the ability of UNITA to wage war, Ambassador Fowler, as chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, presented a draft resolution implementing the bulk of the recommendations contained in the report, which he had presented to the Security Council on 15 March. In the discussion that followed, Council members expressed support for the activist efforts of the Angola Sanctions Committee to date and most offered strong support for the Panel's forthright, far-sighted and innovative recommendations. Many members and non-members highlighted the continuing responsibility of UNITA for the ongoing hostilities in Angola, and urged an ever more rigorous implementation of the sanctions regime. The Council adopted unanimously resolution 1295 (2000) at the close of the meeting, tightening existing sanctions against UNITA; establishing a new monitoring mechanism; and putting into place a process whereby the Council would, after taking into account the report of the new monitoring mechanism and information offered by countries named in the Panel's report as sanctions busters, consider in November appropriate action in relation to States it believed were continuing to violate the sanctions against UNITA.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Council members met in an Arria formula meeting on 7 April, chaired by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Jamaica, Curtis Ward, with representatives of Parliamentarians for Global Action, who reported on the results of a workshop, held at Lusaka from 20 to 23 March, on peace-building efforts in Central Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in support of the Lusaka Agreement.

On 12 April, Council members were briefed in consultations by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Bernard Miyet, on developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the ceasefire and disengagement agreement reached on 8 April among Lusaka signatories. The Under-Secretary-General noted that the agreement lent additional urgency to the question of the rapid deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), highlighting the need for specialized military units. He also expressed concern regarding the grim humanitarian situation. Following consultations, the President, on behalf of Council members, made a statement to the media (see below), welcoming the agreement of 8 April and stressing the importance of the Lusaka parties' adherence to the ceasefire and disengagement plan. Council members also expressed their readiness to do everything possible to speed up the pace of the Mission's phased deployment.

The President also announced on 12 April that the Council had agreed to dispatch a Security Council mission to the region, to discuss with all signatories to the Lusaka Agreement concrete ways to ensure their support and commitment to early implementation of that Agreement and of resolution 1291 (1999). On 24 April, the President wrote to the Secretary-General (S/2000/344), advising him of the mission's terms of reference, its early May departure date, and that it would be headed by Ambassador Holbrooke of the United States of America, in addition to the Ambassadors of France, Mali, Namibia, the Netherlands, Tunisia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Following the receipt on 18 April of the report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/330 and Corr.1), Council members held consultations on 25

April, to hear a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Kamel Morjane. The Special Representative reported on the disengagement plan of 8 April, and on the ceasefire which had come into effect on 14 April. Council members welcomed the positive developments arising from the plan but noted that the challenges ahead must not be overlooked or minimized. Following consultations, the Security Council met in private to hear from Sir Ketumile Masire, facilitator of the inter-Congolese national dialogue, who outlined the financial and resource constraints he was facing in the implementation of his mandate, the status of his work and next steps. Council members expressed strong support and encouragement for his work. The Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, André Mwamba Kapanga, participated in the meeting, and, while his Government did not accept Sir Ketumile's work plan unreservedly, he invited the facilitator to return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue his work. A communiqué was issued following the meeting (S/PV.4132).

Council members again discussed the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in consultations on 27 April. Following those discussions, the President on 29 April wrote to the Secretary-General (S/2000/362), in response to the latter's letter of 18 April (S/2000/334) suggesting that the Security Council might wish to consider creating a panel of experts to investigate the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The President advised the Secretary-General that Council members were giving full and active consideration to the creation of an expert group and intended to come to a decision expeditiously, taking into account, *inter alia,* the conclusions of the Council mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Ethiopia and Eritrea

During April, in a number of consultations, Council members discussed the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, including efforts by the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and others to achieve peace. Following consultations on 26 April, the President spoke to the media on behalf of Council members, conveying their strong support for proximity talks which were to convene at Algiers on 29 April; Council members urged the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea to participate in the talks with a renewed commitment to resolving their dispute through peaceful means (see below).

Rwanda

On 14 April, the Council met in open session to discuss the report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (S/1999/1257). This meeting, chaired by the Foreign Minister of Canada, was the first time the Council had considered the findings and recommendations of the Inquiry since the Secretary-General had transmitted the report to the Council in December 1999. Ingvar Carlsson, former Prime Minister of Sweden and chairman of the Inquiry, briefed the Council and summarized the report's recommendations. Statements by Council members, and by the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, highlighted the importance of lessons learned from the Rwandan tragedy, including the need to carefully tailor peacekeeping mandates and to provide the resources necessary to implement them, and acknowledged the responsibility of the United Nations, including the Security Council, in failing to come to grips with the evolving crisis.

Sierra Leone

On 27 April, Council members received a briefing in informal consultations from the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hédi Annabi, following incidents involving soldiers of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) near disarmament, demobilization and reintegration centres of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Following the consultations, the President, on behalf of the members of the Council, spoke to the media, advising that the Assistant Secretary-General had been asked to convey members' concerns about such incidents to the RUF leadership, through appropriate United Nations channels; he noted that the Council would discuss the situation again, on receipt of the next report of the Secretary-General on UNAMSIL early in May (see below).

Europe

Bosnia and Herzegovina

On 7 April, the Secretary-General conveyed to the Council the monthly report on the operations of the

stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see S/2000/297).

Croatia

On 11 April, the Council received a report (S/2000/305) from the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), pursuant to resolution 1285 (2000). On 28 April, on behalf of the Security Council, the President advised the Secretary-General by letter (S/2000/359) that the Council continued to support UNMOP in the fulfilment of its mandate.

Georgia

The Council received on 24 April the report of the Secretary-General (S/2000/345) concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, and the operations of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia.

Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)

From early April, the Presidency followed up on different aspects of the proposed Security Council mission to Kosovo. Following consultations in the first part of April, consensus was reached on the draft terms of reference introduced by Bangladesh in March. In a letter dated 14 April (S/2000/320), the President advised the Secretary-General that the Council, concerned about obstacles to the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999), had agreed to accept the invitation of his Special Representative, Bernard Kouchner, to visit Kosovo. The letter outlined the mission's objectives, which included observing the operations of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and looking for ways of enhancing support for resolution 1244 (1999). In preparation for the mission, Council members received a briefing on the situation in Kosovo and UNMIK from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in consultations on 24 April. He highlighted the many achievements of UNMIK in very difficult circumstances, but cautioned that substantial challenges remained.

The mission, headed by the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, and composed of Ambassadors from Argentina, Canada, China, Jamaica, Malaysia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, visited Kosovo from 27 to 29 April. The mission issued its findings in a report (S/2000/363) which was discussed by Council members early in May.

The Secretary-General also conveyed to the Council on 17 April the report of the international security presence in Kosovo for the period from 23 February to 22 March 2000 (see S/2000/318).

Middle East

Iraq

International Atomic Energy Agency. The Council received a letter dated 10 April from the Secretary-General (S/2000/300) forwarding a letter from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to that Agency's verification mission to Iraq. IAEA reported that it could not verify Iraq's compliance with obligations imposed under Security Council resolutions.

United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. On 5 April, Council members were briefed in consultations by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on the operations of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), and its proposed renewal for six months, as recommended in the Secretary-General's report (S/2000/269). The President wrote to the Secretary-General on 5 April (S/2000/286), advising him that members concurred with his recommendation to maintain UNIKOM for six months. The Council will next review the operations of UNIKOM by 6 October 2000. In advance of the Council discussion, a meeting of troop contributors to UNIKOM was chaired by the President on 4 April.

United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Council members received on 6 April a note by the Secretary-General (S/2000/292), transmitting for approval the organizational plan for the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Members met in consultations on 13 April to hear a briefing from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix. He discussed the structure, organization, budget and staffing of UNMOVIC, noting that UNMOVIC commissioners planned to meet late in May, allowing him to report back to the Council in early June. On 13 April, the President wrote to the Secretary-General (S/2000/311), advising him that the

members of the Council had discussed and, on that basis, approved the plan as being in keeping with paragraph 6 of resolution 1284 (1999), and looked forward to consultations on its implementation. The President subsequently spoke to the media, on behalf of Council members, regarding the Council's consultations and the letter to the Secretary-General.

Kuwaiti and third party nationals. On 26 April, Council members met in consultations to consider the report of the Secretary-General (S/2000/347 and Corr.1) on issues relating to Kuwaiti and third-party nationals, prepared pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1244 (1996). The Secretary-General's high-level coordinator, Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, outlined his efforts to date and future plans. Following consultations, the President, on behalf of Council members, spoke to the media, stating that Council members had expressed their unanimous support for Ambassador Vorontsov's work (see below). Members also expressed their deep concern about the plight of Kuwaiti and third party nationals and their hope that this issue would be dealt with as a strictly humanitarian one by all concerned, and highlighted the valuable work of ICRC. Council members stressed the importance of dialogue among all parties, and urged Iraq to cooperate with Ambassador Vorontsov and to resume cooperation with all other bodies dealing with this issue.

Situation in the Middle East/Lebanon

In April, the Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Council, advising him of the decision of the Government of Israel to withdraw its forces present in Lebanon by July 2000 (S/2000/294 of 6 April and S/2000/322 of 17 April). Following several consultations, the Council met on 20 April to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/2000/13) endorsing the Secretary-General's stated intention to initiate preparations to enable the United Nations to carry out its responsibilities under resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). The statement also stressed that the Council shared the view of the Secretary-General that cooperation by all parties concerned would be required in order to avoid a deterioration of the situation.

Asia

Afghanistan

In a letter dated 4 April from the Permanent Representative of Argentina and Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning the situation in Afghanistan, the Council received the Committee's latest report (S/2000/282).

Following informal consultations on 7 April, the Security Council held an open briefing, chaired by the Foreign Minister of Canada, on the situation in Afghanistan. The briefing reviewed political, military and economic developments, and the human rights situation, since the Secretary-General's most recent report (S/2000/205). In response to questions raised by several Council members, the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Angela King, urged the Council to continue to press for the human and political rights of women in Afghanistan. At a second meeting, the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2000/12), *inter alia*, reiterating members' grave concern at the continuing conflict and unacceptable human rights situation in Afghanistan, and holding the Taliban leadership responsible for non-compliance with previous Security Council resolutions.

East Timor

On 27 April, the Security Council held an open briefing on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations discussed four main issues, namely, the overall security situation in the territory; refugees; economic and social conditions; and benchmarks that need to be achieved on the path to independence. He reported that the security situation was relatively stable, and improving, including along the border with West Timor. Given the significant destruction of civilian infrastructure in the aftermath of the popular consultation held on 30 August 1999, economic conditions remain a primary concern for UNTAET. The Transitional Administration is faced with strong pressure and high expectations from the local population, and the situation is complicated by the lack of skilled labour in the territory. Members expressed concern about the continuing high numbers of refugees in West Timor, and the condition of the camps there,

with some voicing disquiet over allegations of continued Indonesian armed forces involvement with West Timorese militias. Many delegations expressed respect and admiration for the work accomplished to date under difficult conditions by UNTAET personnel and the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello.

Other matters

The Working Group on Documentation and Procedure continued discussions initiated under the Presidency of Bangladesh, considering how best to communicate Council resolutions, presidential statements and statements to the press to non-State actors, and issues relating to the Council's monthly tentative forecast of work. The Department of Public Information provided the Working Group with a presentation on the Security Council's web site, with a view to making the Council's programme of work available electronically. Finally, the Working Group discussed the issue of meeting nomenclature and considered an outline and description of various Council meeting formats so as to promote greater clarity as to the options available to Council members and the constraints and advantages of each.

Following the death of the former President of Tunisia, the Foreign Minister of Canada, on behalf of Council members, paid tribute to the late Habib Bourguiba at the beginning of the Security Council meeting on 7 April. Mr Axworthy conveyed members' condolences and deep sorrow to the Government and people of Tunisia.

On 13 April, the President met with the Minister of Defence of Indonesia, Jawono Sudarson, regarding the situation in East and West Timor.

Throughout April, the Presidency sought to follow through on Canada's commitment to increasing the transparency of Security Council workings to the broader membership of the United Nations. The Presidency continued the practice of providing in-depth briefings to non-Council members after each informal meeting, and distributed copies of press statements at those briefings.

The Canadian Presidency web site, http://www.un.int/canada, maintained by the Canadian Mission, was regularly updated with the Council's tentative programme of work, statements to the media and statements from open briefings and debates, in both French and English. The site also included a link to the United Nations Security Council documents page.

Further to the note of 31 March by the President (S/2000/274) regarding the distribution of statements at Council meetings, an initiative of the Presidency of Bangladesh, the new system of distributing statements within the formal chamber worked very well in its first month.

Statements to the press by the President of the Security Council

Democratic Republic of the Congo (12 April 2000)

Council members received a comprehensive briefing today by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Bernard Miyet, on recent developments on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Council members welcomed the Political Committee's decision on 8 April 2000 in Kampala to adopt a plan for a ceasefire and the disengagement and redeployment of forces.

Council members stressed the importance of the parties to the Lusaka Agreement fulfilling implementation of the plan and adhering to the ceasefire.

In this respect, Council members emphasized that the task of MONUC remains monitoring of the disengagement of forces. Council members expressed their readiness to do everything possible to speed up the pace of MONUC phase II deployment to oversee the disengagement plan.

Council members also commended the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Kamel Morjane, and of MONUC personnel, to facilitate MONUC deployment.

Members reiterated their concern at the humanitarian situation and noted the mandate of MONUC to facilitate humanitarian relief. In this context, members reiterated the need for all parties to ensure the safe access of relief personnel to all those in need.

Council members expressed concern at continuing shortcomings in MONUC resources and in donors' response to the United Nations consolidated appeal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and encouraged donors to respond urgently.

Council members agreed to dispatch a Security Council mission to the region, to discuss with all signatories to the Lusaka Agreement concrete ways to ensure their support and full commitment to early and full implementation of the Agreement and Security Council resolution 1291 (1999), and are now discussing the logistics.

Iraq (26 April 2000)

Members of the Council heard this morning from Ambassador Vorontsov, the Secretary-General's high-level coordinator for Kuwaiti and third party nationals issues.

Members of the Council expressed their unanimous support for Ambassador Vorontsov's work, for his report transmitted through the Secretary-General on 20 April, and for his future efforts.

Members of the Council expressed their deep concern for the plight of Kuwaiti and third party nationals and expressed their hope that this issue would be dealt with as a strictly humanitarian one by all sides concerned. They highlighted the valuable work of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In this respect, members of the Council stressed the importance of dialogue among all parties, and urged Iraq to cooperate with Ambassador Vorontsov and resume cooperation with all other agencies and bodies dealing with this issue.

Eritrea and Ethiopia (26 April 2000)

Members of the Council were informed through the President that the Organization of African Unity's Chairman, Algeria, has established an early starting date, as early as 29 April, for proximity talks between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Algiers to resolve their ongoing dispute. Members expressed their strong support for the continuing OAU peace process and for the efforts of OAU and the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Boutflika, in this regard.

Council members noted prior commitments made by both parties to attend early proximity talks under OAU direction and urged the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea to participate in the talks with a renewed commitment to peace.

Members underlined their deep concern regarding this issue, urged the parties to resolve their dispute through peaceful means, and will continue to follow the situation closely.

Situation in Sierra Leone (27 April 2000)

Members of the Council were briefed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hédi Annabi, on the situation in Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL.

Council members discussed recent incidents involving UNAMSIL and RUF soldiers. The Assistant Secretary-General was asked to convey Security Council concerns about such incidents, through appropriate channels. The Council will be discussing the situation again in the near future, when the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMSIL is received early in May.

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Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 20 (b)
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: special economic assistance to individual countries or regions

Letter dated 19 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey for your kind attention, the statement issued by the Ministry of External Relations on 16 July 2000 on the violation of the declared ceasefire by the rebel movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter and its annex as an official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 20 (b).

(*Signed*) Mubarak **Rahmtalla**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 19 July 2000 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

Statement issued on 16 July 2000 by the Ministry of External Relations of the Sudan concerning the rebel movement's violation of the ceasefire

1. The Sudanese Government has continued to alert world public opinion to the fact that the SPLA rebel movement is lacking in seriousness whenever it declares a ceasefire for humanitarian purposes in the greater Bahr al-Ghazal region and that it is exploiting this tactic in order to gain time and build up and redeploy its forces with a view to launching offensives and achieving military victory. It has never, at any time, believed in a peaceful solution to the issue of the South.

2. On 19 April 2000, the Sudanese Government declared a halt to aerial bombing in the zones of operations other than for purposes of self-defence. This was followed by the statement of 27 April 2000 in which the Government declared an extension of the ceasefire for a three-month period in the greater Bahr al-Ghazal region so that humanitarian assistance could reach those affected by the war in that area. In another statement, on 3 May 2000, the Sudanese Government expressed the wish that United Nations agencies should use the railway line between Kosti and Wau to bring humanitarian assistance to residents of Bahr al-Ghazal. The Government also acceded to requests from the European Union, the United States of America and the international community for a halt to the operations of the *Murhalin* militia in Bahr al-Ghazal in order to ensure the delivery of relief to those in need.

3. In antithesis to all the positive initiatives taken by the Sudanese Government, the rebel movement exploited this situation and carried out the following operations:

(a) On 15 June 2000, it launched a treacherous offensive against the town of Gogrial in Warab State in the greater Bahr al-Ghazal region.

(b) The movement resumed its offensive against many areas in the greater Bahr al-Ghazal region, attacking Gogrial, Aweil and Kuajena on 20 and 21 June 2000 and continuing its offensive until it had occupied the town of Gogrial.

(c) The rebel movement is now engaged in offensives in many areas of Bahr al-Ghazal in which it had declared a ceasefire. This is illustrated by: an attempt to cut the Raja-Wau road; an attempt to cut the Babanusa-Aweil-Wau road; the seizure of the Lool bridge between Aweil and Babanusa; the occupation of civilian installations along the railway line between Babanusa and Wau; and the targeting of civilian areas in many parts of northern Upper Nile State and the greater Equatoria region.

4. The targeting by the rebel movement of the railway line between Babanusa and Wau, to which the international community, the United States and the European Union attach the greatest importance for the delivery of relief of those in need in Bahr al-Ghazal, confirms that the movement holds international public opinion in contempt and does not honour its own declarations. It also confirms the fact, as noted by the Sudanese Government and stated by Bona Manual in his open letter to

John Garang last May, that he (Garang) has never cared whether innocent people live or die and that his sole objective is to achieve his own personal ambitions over the dead bodies of the innocent inhabitants of the South for whose sake he claims to be waging war.

5. As confirmed by the statement by the Presidency of the European Union of 30 June 2000 and the statement made by British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Peter Hain on 3 July 2000, the military offensives launched by the rebel movement against parts of Bahr al-Ghazal, the targeting of roads and railways and the extension of military operations to civilian population centres all herald a repetition of the tragedy of 1998, when the movement launched similar operations in the same area that had the result of exacerbating the famine and causing a humanitarian catastrophe that cost the lives of thousands of innocent people.

6. The Sudanese Government once more alerts the international community to the irresponsible conduct of the rebel movement, to its ongoing violation of the ceasefire that it declared and to the fact that it has boycotted the peace talks and thus placed the lives and property of civilian citizens in jeopardy. It calls upon the international community to condemn this conduct in the strongest terms and to bring pressure to bear on the movement so as to compel it to comply with its own declarations, halt military operations and ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need in all parts of southern Sudan.

7. Once again, the Sudanese Government confirms its commitment to the ceasefire that has been declared and renews its call for agreement on a comprehensive ceasefire and the achievement of a lasting peace. At the same time, however, it affirms its right to respond to aggression and to protect the lives and property of its citizens. It also affirms that it cannot stand idly by while the rebel movement occupies the towns of Bahr al-Ghazal one after another.

United Nations A/54/944–S/2000/711

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 63
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Fifty-fifth year

Letter dated 20 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Your Special Representative, Mr. Alvaro de Soto, during the last day of the third round of proximity talks held in Geneva on 12 July 2000, reiterated an appeal on your behalf to the two sides "to play down the tone, size and content of the official rhetoric accompanying any events that will take place" in Cyprus during the period between the last and the forthcoming round of talks.

Notwithstanding your above-mentioned appeal, we have yet again witnessed a number of provocative actions by the Turkish side during these past few days which arrogantly ignore your appeal to refrain from such actions. You will also recall the letter dated 17 July 2000 from the President of the Republic, Mr. Clerides, addressed to you, on the provocative actions of the Turkish military forces, which created an explosive situation in Strovilia.

In this regard, I would like to draw your attention to violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and the Nicosia flight information region, by a great number of military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force on 14, 16, 17, 19 and 20 July 2000, in some cases flying also over the government-controlled area of Nicosia, including the buffer zone. It is emphasized that seven (7) of these aircraft were transport/personnel carriers and we would find it difficult to believe that they came only for parade reasons. Further, on 17 and 18 July 2000, five (5) warships, two (2) of which are frigates, another two (2) submarines and one (1) mother ship, of the Turkish Navy violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and arrived at Kyrenia port.

At this point I would like to refer to the letter, dated 13 July 2000, from the Turkish Permanent Representative addressed to you (A/54/938-S/2000/688), in which certain untrue information was transmitted to you concerning alleged National Guard rearmament activities. These allegations are an obvious attempt to pre-empt any reactions from the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and, at the same time, to provide an alibi to all those actions by the Turkish occupation forces that would constitute a definite violation of your appeal to refrain from provocation, as mentioned above.

00-54644 (E) 250700

In any event, all National Guard activities fall within the legitimate sphere of defence of the Republic of Cyprus, made necessary as a result of the 1974 Turkish military invasion and the illegal stationing of massive Turkish occupation forces, as described herein below, ever since. At this point, I would like to reiterate the proposal of the President of the Republic, Mr. Clerides, for complete demilitarization of the island and declare the readiness of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus towards this end.

As you will recall, in your report to the Security Council on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, dated 10 December 1995 (S/1995/1020), you correctly described the occupied areas of Cyprus as "one of the most densely militarized areas in the world". In this regard, I would like to bring the following to your attention: the Turkish occupation forces in Cyprus consist of approximately thirty-six thousand (36,000) troops and officers divided into two (2) infantry divisions, one (1) armoured brigade, one (1) armoured regiment, three (3) artillery regiments, one (1) special forces regiment, along with other supportive and administrative units. Furthermore, there are three hundred and eighty-six (386) M48A5T2 main battle tanks, four hundred and sixty-six (466) M-113 and NUROL armoured personnel carriers, four hundred and thirty-seven (437) artillery guns and self-propelled mortars of various ranges, one hundred and twenty (120) MILAN-TOW antitank missiles and four hundred (400) recoilless rifle 106 mm antitank guns.

I would also like to bring to your attention that, since the beginning of this year, the Turkish occupation forces were further reinforced with forty-four (44) M48A5T1 and M48A5T2 main battle tanks, sixty-two (62) NUROL and M-113 armoured personnel carriers, some of which carry TOW antitank missiles, and a number of various wheeled armoured and special mission vehicles.

Last but not least, mention has to be made of the appearance of COBRA attack helicopters illegally stationed in the occupied areas in violation, among others, of United States of America domestic laws, according to which American arms can only be used for purposes of defence, and of bilateral United States-Turkey agreements.

While strongly protesting these actions and attitude, which flagrantly violate international law, as well as Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, and calling for their cessation, I would like, once more, to express the hope that the necessary positive attitude will be finally shown by Turkey, so that the proximity talks in progress, as well as all other efforts for finding a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem, on the basis of United Nations resolutions, will not be adversely affected.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sotos **Zackheos**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/54/945–S/2000/723

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Security Council

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Agenda item 50
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Security Council
Fifty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 20 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit the text of a letter dated 20 July 2000 from A. Abdullah, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, addressed to you concerning the developments in Afghanistan.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 50, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. A. G. Ravan **Farhâdi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-54754 (E) 280700

Annex to the identical letters dated 20 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan presents its compliments to H. E. the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to communicate the following points about the problem of Afghanistan:

--Chapter I--

On the Renewed Summer Offensive Launched by the Taliban-Pakistan-bin Laden Axis

--A--

The United Nations was duly informed through the letter dated 27 June 2000 of the reports on the arrival of more than 2,000 fresh recruits including Pakistan's Army regulars to the eastern Province of Jalalabad from Pakistan and large-scale preparations by Pakistan and the Taliban mercenaries for subsequent renewed offensives of July 1 and July 9, 2000 by the Taliban mercenaries, consignments of Pakistan's Armed Forces and members of the bin Laden Brigade, launched against the positions of the Armed Forces of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in the Shamali Plains, north of Kabul.

July 1 Offensive: The first offensive, aimed to be expanded to the Sâlang Highway and Ghôrband and Nijrâb Districts, was repulsed, while the attackers suffered as many as 500 dead or wounded. The Government took as many as 40 Taliban mercenaries captive, presently in its custody.

Post-fighting reports by the Intelligence sources of the Government indicated that more than 200 Taliban dead bodies were transferred to Kabul, while many Pakistanis were taken to Pakistan. Meanwhile, many of the wounded opposition fighters were taken to the 'Taxila' and the 'Fowji' (<<Army>>) Foundation Hospitals in Peshawar, Pakistan.

During the operation, the Taliban conducted air sorties, leading to the death of many innocent civilians and the destruction of civilian sites.

July 9 Offensive: On July 9, 2000, the Taliban-Pakistan-bin Laden axis launched yet another offensive targeting Khalazay Village north of Kabul. At least 6,000 opposition troops including Pakistani military personnel, Pakistani students from religious schools,

Arabs and Taliban were involved in the operation, who despite limited initial gains were forced out by the Armed Forces of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

The Taliban casualties in this operation included 200 dead and over 300 wounded. Reports confirmed the destruction of 14 opposition tanks and 18 trucks, still laying in the area.

The indiscriminate Taliban aerial bombardment of civilian sites in the City of Châriкâr and Villages of Khalâzay, Rubât and Chaikal in the Shamâli Plains this time, however, left 28 civilians dead, 50 wounded and thousands internally displaced.

Ironically, after the defeat of the opposition, its mouthpieces launched a campaign of disinformation in an attempt to put the blame of the renewed fighting on the Islamic State of Afghanistan. The campaign interestingly gave bogus assurances by the Taliban not to engage in any further fighting.

With the elaborate details of the latest rounds of fighting, particularly of the use of conventional tactics, command and control of battles and use of heavy artillery—not familiar to the Taliban—as well as intercepted radio transmissions and massive logistical support which prove a progressive involvement of Pakistan Army personnel, it was a matter of dismay that the Security Council stopped short of at least condemning the attacks.

It may be recalled that last year's 'Summer Offensive' by the Taliban-Pakistan-bin Laden axis, despite our early warnings to the Security Council, led to the great humanitarian tragedy in which hundreds of thousands of the Shamâli inhabitants were driven out of their homes, who sought refuge in the Panjshir Valley. In light of that, it shall be reminded that primarily an opposition defeat in the battlefields thus far has prevented recurrence of such a tragic situation, one which cannot be absolutely thwarted in the future, should the renewed offensives not be condemned and measures aimed at their prevention not taken.

--B--

1. At the present, Pakistan and its Taliban mercenaries are busy building up for yet another round of fighting, projected to begin any time soon.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan earnestly appeals to the United Nations to adopt immediate measures aimed at preventing further Taliban-Pakistan-bin Laden attacks. The Islamic State of Afghanistan expects of the Security Council to seriously condemn the renewed 'Summer Offensive' and further preparations by the Taliban-Pakistan-bin Laden axis.

2. The Islamic State of Afghanistan further appeals to the Security Council to mandate the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) to dispatch an investigation team to Afghanistan to verify and report to the Security Council on the

presence of Pakistani armed men and Arab fighters—working in collusion with the Taliban.

--C--

Adhering to its solemn commitment made during the two rounds of indirect talks sponsored by the Organization of Islamic Conference in March and May 2000 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia—rejected categorically by the Taliban—the Islamic State of Afghanistan reiterates its firm position that there is no military solution to the Afghan conflict and hereby declares once again its genuine desire and readiness for the cessation of armed conflict, a cease-fire and engagement in direct negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations.

--Chapter II--

On the remarks by the Pakistani Chief Executive and the Search for 'Lebensraum' by the Military Junta

--A--

The main Pakistani position until early May 2000 suggested that Pakistan was not intervening in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Pakistani diplomats and officials claimed Pakistan maintained contacts with both parties to the conflict.

--B--

However, Pakistan's NNI news agency reported on Thursday, May 25, 2000 that General Pervez Musharraf claimed Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy "in accordance with Pakistan national interest."

Advocating that Pakhtoons (Pashtuns) should be on the side of Pakistan, the General was quoted as saying, "We have a national security interest, both demographic and geographic." He further stated that in the realization of this security interest, "Pakhtoons should be on our side and they (Pakhtoons) are represented by Taliban."

General Musharraf reiterated, once again, those points in a statement in the Pakistani Institute of International Affairs on June 23, 2000. "With Afghanistan, one has to understand Pakistan national security concerns and must be clear to everyone, though not done earlier. No country in the world can force any other country to give up its national security interest," the General was quoted as saying.

The confession by the Pakistani military ruler marked a totally new perspective in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

--C--

The Pakistani military junta, unleashing this fresh political campaign under the pretext of "national security interest" at the cost of sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan. This is a flagrant violation of recognized international norms and principles and in clear contempt to the UN Charter. Pakistan has claimed the right to impose a certain political system through an ethnic group in its neighboring country.

This new method bears resemblance to the ideology pursued by the Nazis during WWII, who under the scheme of "lebensraum" justified their expansionism and hegemony at the price of millions killed and the invasion of adjacent and faraway territories.

--D--

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, in light of the astonishing statements by General Pervez Musharraf, who through explicit articulation of the 'reasons' for the continued Pakistani military backing of the Taliban seeks Afghanistan's subjugation, would like to put the following in perspective:

1. The remarks, for the first time, bring to light the Pakistani junta's long-pursued hegemonic agenda aimed at turning Afghanistan into a subservient State and in fact a hub of terrorism, extremism, cultivation and trafficking of drugs, from which the Pakistani world-known corrupt military has perpetually benefited.

2. The Islamic State of Afghanistan strongly condemns the flagrant interventionist and ethnically provocative remarks on Afghanistan by the chief of Pakistani junta General Parvez Musharraf, which clearly aim to incite hatred among different ethnic groups of Afghanistan.

3. General Pervez Musharraf has to realize that his statements of May 25 and June 23, 2000 constitute a mistake and a confession, which complements the Pakistani historic blunder, revealing the Junta's expansionist goals in Afghanistan. The General's comments are neither beneficial to the peace and security of Pakistan or Afghanistan, nor the region. It is time that Pakistan's "Chief Executive," the military junta and its officials steered their country away from hegemonistic adventures they have embarked upon in Afghanistan.

4. The demagogic invoking of the so-called "Pakistan's security interests"--- in reality at the cost of sovereignty, independence and national unity of Afghanistan --- blatantly referred to by the Pakistani junta chief, reminds of the all-along hypocritical, deceitful and lip-serving attitude of the Pakistani regime toward the UN peace process and toward the project of convening a Lôya Jirga (Grand Assembly) in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Junta opposes the formation of a the "broad-based, fully representative and multi-ethnic government" mainstream of the process in Afghanistan , in a gross contradiction to Pakistan's acclaimed backing of the UN peace process in Afghanistan.

5. At a time when the Pakistani military regime can no longer stealthily mask its evident military involvement in Afghanistan camouflaged as the Taliban, and while the world community is getting ever-more focused on the Pakistani regime's creeping operation of narco-terrorism in Afghanistan, the views expressed by Mr. Musharraf on the "Islamabad demographic and geographic interests in Afghanistan through the Taliban as the representatives of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan" are a premeditated attempt to legitimize Pakistan's outright aggression in and domination of Afghanistan.

6. The remarks, irresponsible, hostile and yet grotesque, made by a military dictator, do not represent in any way the true aspirations of the Pakistani nation, having enjoyed historical fraternity and good neighborliness with the people of Afghanistan.

7. General Musharraf's statements are based on an erroneous perception of Afghanistan and a grotesquely and legendarily false 'statistics' of ethnic groups. Historically, Afghanistan has been a country of an ethnic mosaic, having fraternally and peacefully lived in a balanced coexistence for centuries.

8. The people of Afghanistan are aware that promotion of ethnic cleansing of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other non-Pashtun groups is the result of provocations by the government of Pakistan and the ISI, committed under the guise of realizing Pashtun domination throughout Afghanistan.

9. Statements by General Musharraf have become subject to strong condemnation by the people of Afghanistan, including the Pashtuns and prominent Pashtun leaders.

10. The segment of the Taliban who are Afghan nationals have been brainwashed by the Pakistani military intelligence services (ISI) in such a manner so as to lack complete historical knowledge of Afghanistan, and hence to act counter to the religious, historic and ethnic traditions of their countrymen. Hence, their behavior—like an alien group—categorizes them as void of Afghan culture.

11. Pakistan's administrations have continuously denied local Pashtuns their fundamental rights in Pakistan. But now, the current administration unjustifiably and strangely claims itself to only protect the Pashtuns. Contrarily, even the Pashtuns in Pakistan have not had the right to name their own land.

12. The Islamic State of Afghanistan, backed by the undying resolve and vigilance of the people and of the Armed Forces of the Islamic State of Afghanistan will continue to stand firm in defending the sovereignty, independence and national unity of Afghanistan against Pakistani aggression, carried out by armed Pakistani groups siding with the mercenary Taliban bands.

13. The Islamic State of Afghanistan calls upon the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the entire international community to seriously take note of the hegemonistic remarks by the Pakistani military ruler. These words indicate Pakistan's professed precepts in dealing with the situation in Afghanistan and the subsequent dire regional and international threats and consequences.

--Chapter III--

On the Heightened Pakistani-Taliban Terrorist Activities, their Perilous Impact on the Safety and Security of the Afghan People, and Implications for Regional Peace and Stability

--A--

Less then 2 years after exposing the people of Afghanistan and the Afghan soil to an American missile strike launched back in August 1998 against terrorist training camps operated by international terrorists, in which more than a dozen of Pakistani terrorists were killed, the Pkistani-Taliban nexus has yet again provoked further threat of possible strikes by the Russian Federation, as an act of reprisal against new targets in the Pakistani-Taliban occupied territories of Afghanistan.

It is important to remember that terrorist training camps operating from the Taliban-held territories of Afghanistan whose dismantling has been repeatedly called for by the United Nations and the entire international community, have been established by the Government of Pakistan through the Taliban mercenaries and other extremist networks, who continue to utilize these territories as a ground for terrorist training, sheltering, planning and dispatching of elements seeking hostile acts against countries of the region and beyond, under the guise of Islam mainly in pursuit of Pakistani hegemonistic objectives.

For the past two years, the United Nations Security Council in its resolutions 1214 of 8 December 1998 and 1267 of 15 October 1999, unanimously adopted, has explicitly demanded the Taliban mercenaries and its foreign collaborator, Pakistan, to refrain from sheltering, supporting and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts from the Afghanistan soil against other countries, and to extradite to the requesting States those individuals indicted for committing international acts of terrorism.

The international community has a fresh memory of the involvement of Pakistan and of its mercenaries, the Taliban, in the Kargil operation in India. Although the operation earned the Pakistani Government an outright defeat and a bone-chilling humiliation, the Pakistani military intelligence (ISI) managed to redirect those combined recruits to subsequent operations in Afghanistan. The latter operation, however, then came to be best known for the scorched-earth practice and forcible displacement of some 200,000 civilians, north of Kabul by the same groups. Dozens of those invaders were held captive by the Islamic State of Afghanistan and still remain in its captivity.

--B--

Remaining highly alarmed by the latest deterioration of the situation in and around Afghanistan, directly resulting from Pakistani-sponsored policy of military occupation and training of terrorists, the Islamic State of Afghanistan wishes to put the following in perspective:

1. The people of Afghanistan have become victimized by terrorism and by the activities of elements affiliated with an array of international terrorist organizations from Southeast Asia to South Asia and the Middle East, who all continue to be recruited by the Government of Pakistan through its military intelligence, the ISI. All of this is done for waging what Pakistanis extremists call "Jihâd" or a holy war against States within and outside the region. Pakistan also remains as the sole origin of arming and equipping of the stretching columns of terrorists coming from around the globe to Pakistan, who then are dispatched to Afghanistan for military training and deployment to locations in part other than the front lines within Afghanistan. Pakistan is providing ground and air support, petroleum and other logistical support to the Pakistani-Taliban-bin Laden army, the latest developments.

2. The Islamic State of Afghanistan strongly condemns the outrageous ceaseless Pakistan adventurist activities in Afghanistan, which have put the life and property of the innocent civilian people of Afghanistan at grave risk of reprisal acts by third States threatened. It shall be reminded in this context, that provocation of any reprisal act by a third State on Afghanistan and thereupon the potential damaging results on the life and property of the people of Afghanistan would establish Pakistan as entirely responsible.

3. The Islamic State of Afghanistan remains convinced upon the inadmissibility of the use of the Afghan soil for waging war and engaging in hostile acts against the security and stability of third States in the region and beyond. However, it also believes that air strikes or aerial bombardment of terrorist training camps, given the inefficiency of the August 1998 cruise missile raids, will not eliminate terrorist activities.

4. The Islamic State of Afghanistan reiterates its condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The Islamic State of Afghanistan believes it is high time that the UN Security Council—in accordance with relevant Resolutions—shall undertake effective measures against Pakistan, which is the prime source of establishing terrorist training camps and terrorist activities in the Taliban-held territories of Afghanistan for the purposes of advancing Pakistan's geopolitical interests in South and Central Asia, and beyond. The Islamic State of Afghanistan also calls upon the Security Council to take further drastic measures against the Taliban mercenaries to curb their terrorist activities.

--Chapter IV--
On the OIC-sponsored Jeddah Peace Talks

--A--

Responding positively to the proposal for peace talks made by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Islamic State of Afghanistan on 8 March, 2000, attended in good faith the two-day peace talks, the first in a series, hosted by the OIC in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, which were also attended by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Hon. Francesc Vendrell.

The OIC team, holding separate meetings and discussing different issues with the two parties in Jeddah, laid special emphasis on the need for observing a moratorium on the fighting, citing the sanctity and importance of the approaching advent of the Hajj and of

the Eid al-Adhâ. The suggestion, though not initialed, was embraced with no preconditions by the delegation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

It is worth reminding that the Jeddah meeting came only days after the Taliban mercenaries had launched a renewed offensive, during which the Security Council on March 3, 2000 expressed its dismay and recalled the repeated demands by the Council that the Afghan parties cease the fighting and resume negotiations under UN auspices without delay and preconditions in full compliance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Against this background, however, the Taliban mercenaries, evidently commissioned by the ruling Pakistani ISI, appear to have had the intention of pursuing their military option, for their unabated aerial and ground attacks on the Government-held territories have continued, to date.

Below is a brief record of the Pakistani-Taliban military operations which have taken place after the Jeddah meeting:

--10 March, 6:00a.m. Afghanistan standard time (AST):
Pakistani-Taliban forces attacked Northern Sâlang. The attack was repulsed within the course of a two-hour battle. Attackers sustained 60 casualties and left behind 7 mortal remains;

--11 March, 4:00a.m. AST:
The Pakistani-Taliban troops launched a multi-pronged attack on Surkh-Sang and Bajgâh areas around Dara-i-Suff, south-west of the province of Samangan, making some advances. The Government forces repelled the mercenaries form the areas later in the day;

--13 March, 7-9a.m. AST:
An attack by the Pakistani-Taliban on Ailam Bourka was pushed back;

--March 14, 7-4:30p.m. AST:
The Pakistani-Taliban mounted once again a cohesive attack on Northern Sâlang, infiltrating the front lines. The offensive was forcefully repulsed later the same day.

The on-going intermittent onslaughts by the Pakistani-Taliban are believed to herald an up-coming all out offensive by the Pakistani-Taliban, according to a battle plan discussed on March 10, 2000 at a joint meeting between the Taliban field commanders and a visiting senior Pakistani military corps commander in the Kunduz province, intercepted by the State security services.

--B--

The second round of peace talks between the representatives of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Taliban militia, sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic

Conference, held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, from May 7-10, 2000, ended without any major breakthrough.

The three-day talks, also attended by Mr. Francesc Vendrell, UN Special Representative to Afghanistan, came amidst widespread reports of preparations by the Pakistani-Taliban mercenaries to launch annual major 'summer offensives.' However, proceeding from the high interest in a peaceful solution of the conflict, the Islamic State of Afghanistan took part in the talks in good faith.

The talks were attended by the Islamic State of Afghanistan with the earnest desire of addressing substantial issues, inter alia, the immediate withdrawal of Pakistani military and paramilitary personnel and all other armed foreign nationals and "volunteers" and the formation of a broad-based, multi-ethnic, and fully representative government, as called for by numerous UN GA and SC resolutions. Yet, dismayingly, the issues of abandoning large-scale military offensives, refraining from targeting civilians and guaranteeing free movement of humanitarian assistance, among the four agenda items tabled in Jeddah, were rejected by the Taliban militia, who only agreed to one, namely the exchange of POWs, to be subsequently implemented under joint supervision of a committee composed of the ICRC, the OIC, Iran and Pakistan.

Reacting to the disappointing posturing of the Taliban in the talks, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, for the sake of the record, expressed concerns, among many, on the continued Taliban intransigence, the militia's resort to warfare, and the mercenaries' aim of further targeting innocent civilians.

While wishing for a peaceful solution to the conflict, the Islamic State of Afghanistan remains convinced that the Taliban are still adamant on pursuing a military option, which unveiled quickly in subsequent events.

--C--

On May 11, 2000, one day after the completion of the second round of the OIC Jeddah talks, eyewitness reports reaching the authorities of the Islamic State of Afghanistan revealed that the Taliban prison authorities rounded up as many as 198 hostages imprisoned, predominantly young Uzbek and Hazâra men, from their prison cells in Mazâr, Samangân and Sheberghân, and after having brutally murdered them, buried the hostages in newly dug mass graves, identified to be in the following locations: Tapa-é-Qul Mohammad (a hill) on the outskirts of Mazâr; the mountain ranges of Koh-é-Cheghet in the Province of Samangan; and in the outskirts of Rubâtak Pass in the Province of Samangân.

--Chapter V--

On Loya Jirga or 'the Traditional Grand Assembly' as a Political Solution to the Conflict in Afghanistan

The Islamic State of Afghanistan is aware of the political difficulties involving general elections as a means of realizing the will of the people under the prevailing difficult

circumstances. Duly, the Islamic State of Afghanistan considers the Lôya Jirga (Grand Assembly) as one of the viable options in overcoming the ominous prsent-day Afghan crisis. As such the Islamic State of Afghanistan fully welcomes the Lôya Jirga and is willing to render its utmost cooperation toward its convening.

i. Internal Aspects:

It is crucial to realize that 'Émirate' as an institution negates –either in principle or concept—a genuine Lôya Jirga, and therefore, is doomed to an inevitable slap of bold rejection by the entire Afghan nation. Possessing powers above the law by the virtue of theocratic despotism, through issuance of immediate decrees, which seek to nullify democratic and administrative institutions would absolutely counter the notion of a representative government. Mindful of this, the Islamic State of Afghanistan would continue to cast off the notion of 'Émirate' as unfitting for the Afghan people. Only the Pakistani government has practically recognized the theocratic 'Émirate' and the title of Mullâh Omar as the Amir-ul-Momineen (the Commander of the Faithful).

ii. External Aspects:

Security, by far, is the most important pre-requisite for the convening of the Lôya Jirga. Hence, each and every armed foreign national, including those called 'volunteers', members of different foreign organizations and groups, maintaining direct or covert links to a foreign army, are to leave Afghanistan at once, which would pave the way for the convening of the Lôya Jirga.

iii. Terms of the Lôya Jirga:

An acceptable representative platform is to be established and agreed upon by various segments of the Afghan society.

The Lôya Jirga has to be convened inside Afghanistan.

There is no absolute ethnic majority in Afghanistan. Hence, all major ethnic groups including the Hazâras, the Pashtuns, the Uzbeks and the Tâjiks must be justly and equitably represented in all institutions and governmental bodies. (This however, is not to be construed as either preclusion and or exclusion of other groups including the Turkmen, the Balûchis, the Nooristânis and others.)

iv. The Loya Jirga needs to serve two purposes:

Primarily, the aim is to tackle the present-day Afghan crisis through the establishment of a transitional fully-representative, multi-ethnic and broad-based government, in line

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS

with the wishes of the Afghan people, under the supervision of the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

2. Secondarily, a mandate must be foreseen within multilateral agreements on the convening of the Lôya Jirga for the enactment of a Constitution by the coming Lôya Jirga, which, inter alia, shall include the indispensable 'Principle of Delegation of Authority to Local Administrations.' General and Local elections, conducive to forming a government to replace the transitional setup, will have to be addressed within a clear-cut time-bound framework.

--Chapter VI--
On Explosions in Taliban-held territories of Afghanistan

1. On 10 July and on 17 July 2000, two explosions occurred at the site of the Pakistani Embassy and the diplomatic residence in Kabul. These were preceded by explosions of military depôts in Khair-Khâna and Maidân-Shahr.

Since the aforementioned sites are under complete guard of Taliban soldiers, the reason for their occurrence must be sought in internal rivalry and division among Taliban ranks.

Pakistan is the only country in the world which maintains an active 'diplomatic' mission in Kabul. There is the possibility of plots by the ISI and some Taliban aimed at provoking sympathy in the Pakistani public opinion in favor of this 'mission.'

2. Contrary to Taliban propaganda, the Islamic State of Afghanistan never has and never will resort to such acts of terror.

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE U.N. • NEW YORK

(*Signed*) Dr. A. **Abdullâh**
Acting Foreign Minister

United Nations A/54/946

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Fifty-fourth session
Item 116 (b)
Human rights questions: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Letter dated 19 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw your attention to information received from the government organs of the Republic of Belarus in connection with the recent circulation as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 116 (b), of a statement by the Presidency of the European Union concerning the sentencing of Mr. Statkevich and Mr. Shchukin (A/54/935).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 116 (b).

(*Signed*) Alyaksandr **Sychov**
Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations

00-54674 (E) 020800 140800

Annex to the letter dated 19 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

1. Mr. N. Statkevich and Mr. V. Shchukin were convicted for committing criminal offences. The charges that the sentences were politically motivated are baseless and unfounded.

In particular, the sentencing on Mr. Statkevich was based on two incidents.

The first was the unauthorized procession of 27 July 1999 in the centre of Minsk, which blocked the thoroughfare. In spite of verbal appeals by the police, the actions of Mr. Statkevich, who had been using a megaphone to call on the crowd to break through the police cordon, led to clashes between demonstrators and members of law enforcement agencies.

The second incident occurred during a demonstration on 17 October 1999. The organizers of the demonstration had received permission from the municipal authorities to hold a meeting in a specific district of the city (close to Bangalor Square) without any demonstrations or processions in the city centre. However, as a result of the participation in the meeting of leaders of the opposition, including Mr. Statkevich, who spoke three times and called for the continuation of the second phase of the so-called "freedom march", the participants in the meeting made their way along the streets of the city centre, blocking the traffic. This ended in clashes with members of law enforcement agencies and, in addition to damage to city property and major inconveniences for the city's population, there were injuries among the police.

The criminal cases against Mr. Statkevich, the organizer, and V. Shchukin, an active participant, were based on article 186, part 3, of the Penal Code of the Republic of Belarus which deals with "the organization of or active participation in group actions involving a serious breach of the public order", for which the maximum penalty is up to three years' imprisonment.

Moreover, the volume of cogent evidence gathered during the court examination might well have led to the application of a very different article of the Penal Code (art. 76), which concerns the organization of mass disturbances for which the maximum penalty is up to 15 years' imprisonment.

The court's verdict with respect to Mr. Statkevich (two years' suspended sentence) and Mr. Shchukin (one year's suspended sentence) is not excessively severe and entails no deprivation of liberty.

2. In Belarus, different points of view, including the opposition, have access to the mass media. Of the country's more than 1 000 printed publications, only 200 are State-controlled.

Only recently the State electronic mass media broadcast a series of transmissions with the participation of representatives of all socio-political forces, including opposition parties. Representatives of the opposition, such as M. Grib, S. Bogdankevich, A. Dobrovolsky, A. Lebedko, S. Kalyakin, O. Abramova, N. Statkevich, V. Vecherko and others, regularly take part in broadcasts, including live broadcasts. This clearly demonstrates that the demand of all potential participants in the forthcoming parliamentary elections for access to the mass media is being met.

When the electoral campaign begins, access to the mass media will be governed by the relevant provisions of the Electoral Code, which provide for equal opportunities for all registered candidates, without exception.

In particular, the Code entitles the candidates to free use of State television and radio as well as to the free publication of their pre-election programmes in the press. All candidates are free able to produce pre-election posters.

3. Belarus is fully committed to scrupulous compliance with all its international obligations and to the holding of free and fair elections in accordance with the relevant international standards of electoral law.

The Electoral Code of the Republic of Belarus has been drawn up in accordance with Belarus's new Constitution and also takes account of the universally recognized principles and standards of international law relating to the organization of the electoral process and the legal regulations concerning the holding of elections and referendums that are applied in other countries. the Code fully reflects international electoral standards, which provide for envisage the conduct of the electoral process on the basis of such democratic principles as universal, free, equal and direct elections by secret ballot. Many provisions of the Electoral Code governing the conduct of elections have been improved, developed and made more specific.

It should be pointed out that the adoption of the Electoral Code was preceded by a protracted phase of detailed discussions and revisions not only by government bodies but also by the broad strata of the Belarusian public. One hundred and ten Belarusian political parties and public associations, representing practically the entire spectrum of the country's emerging civil society, took part in the socio-political dialogue on this issue. Prior to its first reading, in the House of Representatives, the Code was sent for suggestions and comments to 23 national and international organizations as well as to the Advisory and Monitoring Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and political parties. By the time of the first reading of the Code, Parliament had received 182 proposals concerning 80 articles, and 48 amendments were made to 46 articles of the draft Code. In preparing the draft Electoral Code for its second reading by the House of Representatives, changes and additions were made to article 5.

Many of the proposals made by the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group were taken into account in preparing the draft Electoral Code, including proposals on the joint establishment of commissions by representative and executive bodies, on changing the procedure for verifying subscription lists and authenticating citizens' signatures, on lifting the prohibition on the nomination to Parliament of persons who have incurred administrative penalties, on discontinuing the practice of holding people to account for boycotting elections, on openness in the counting of votes and establishing the results of voting and elections, and on lowering the level of voter turnout required in order for elections to the House of Representatives to be recognized as valid in the second round of voting from 50 to 25 per cent.

One of the highly important amendments to the Code as adopted was the significant broadening of the powers of observers at elections, including foreign (international) observers. Belarus is convinced that this provision of the Code will make it possible to ensure, with the participation of national observers, that elections

take place in an open and honest manner and that the involvement of foreign (international) observers will be conducive to the conduct of elections in full compliance with international electoral standards.

4. The work of the participants in the dialogue on improving the Electoral Code confirms the effectiveness of that institution and its potential for resolving other key problems of Belarusian society. The dialogue is open at all times to all, including leaders of the opposition, who wish to make a practical contribution towards the attainment of national accord.

United Nations A/54/947

General Assembly

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21 July 2000

Original: English

Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 31
Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity

Letter dated 21 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Gambia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to request that you arrange for the distribution as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, of the declaration on the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-sixth ordinary session, held at Lomé from 10 to 12 July 2000 (see annex).

(*Signed*) Baboucarr-Blaise Ismaila **Jagne**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the Gambia
Chairman of the African group for the month of July

00-54650 (E) 250700

Annex to the letter dated 21 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Gambia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration on the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries

12 July 2000

1. **We**, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting at the thirty-sixth ordinary session of our Assembly and the sixth ordinary session of the African Economic Community in Lomé, Togo, from 10 to 12 July 2000, **have** undertaken a critical review of the socio-economic situation of the 33 least developed countries in Africa.

2. **WE NOTE** with concern that the socio-economic situation in these countries has continued to deteriorate, and that this situation has been exacerbated by external debt, inadequate infrastructure facilities, as well as by conflicts in some regions and natural disasters like cyclones, floods and drought in others, leading to a rising level of poverty. Despite the drastic structural adjustment and policy reforms carried out by our countries, the number of countries in our continent classified in the category of least developed countries has not decreased.

3. The international community, including the institutions within the United Nations system, has demonstrated its support to the least developed countries through special initiatives targeted at this category of countries. In this regard, **WE WELCOME** the opportunity provided by the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries as a forum for the international community to go beyond general declarations of intent and commitment, and embark on concrete implementable actions directed at ameliorating the socio-economic situation in the least developed countries, with a view to attaining the internationally agreed target of reducing the level of poverty by half by the year 2015.

4. **WE REAFFIRM**, at the same time, that the development of African least developed countries is primarily the responsibility of their governments and peoples. In this regard, **WE COMMIT** ourselves individually and collectively to support the effort of the least developed countries in our continent through programmes for promoting regional economic cooperation. This, **WE BELIEVE**, is the only way forward for Africa as a whole to integrate into the global economy equitably.

5. In order to assist the least developed countries deal with the serious challenges they continue to face, **WE CALL ON** the international community to redouble its efforts in the critical areas of debt cancellation, resource flows, capacity-building and infrastructural development with concrete programmes to be worked out in close consultation and cooperation with our continental and regional organizations.

6. For the least developed countries to be a credible participant in the global economy and conscious of the unavoidable phenomenon of globalization, **WE CALL** on the Third United Nations Conference on the least developed countries to launch a programme for the accelerated transformation of the economies of these countries, with emphasis on expanding and diversifying the production and export base. While **WE COMMEND** the decision to improve market access for products from the least developed countries, we firmly believe that these opportunities can be

exploited advantageously only when the required production and export capacities have been established and strengthened in the least developed countries.

7. With regard to the debt problem of the least developed countries, **WE WELCOME** the announcement concerning the enhancing of the HIPC initiative and call on the international community to provide adequate resources for its effective operationalization. While underscoring the fact that external debt and the debt service payments represent an excruciating burden on our continent and stifle our effort at development, **WE CALL ON** the creditor countries and multilateral financial institutions to provide real debt relief, including debt cancellation in favour of all least developed countries, complemented by increased capital flows, particularly official development assistance, to meet the internationally agreed target, and foreign direct investment. **WE,** on our part, undertake to commit the funds released from such actions to the development of our societies with a view to eradicating poverty.

8. **WE PLEDGE** to lend our full support to the African least developed countries in preparing for the Third United Nations Conference and to ensure the effective participation of all our countries. **WE CALL ON** the Secretary-General of OAU, in consultation and cooperation with all the regional economic communities, UNCTAD and other related United Nations bodies, to assist the least developed countries in the preparation for the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries and to organize in that respect an African Ministerial Conference for the purpose of adopting an African common position.

United Nations A/54/948

General Assembly

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Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 110
Implementation of the outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women

Letter dated 19 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On 10 June 2000, during the final plenary meeting of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly, entitled "Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century", the United States of America dissociated itself from the consensus on three paragraphs of the outcome document that specifically address the topics of globalization and debt relief. In our statement, we said, in part: "These paragraphs characterize globalization and debt as significant obstacles to achieving gender equality. It is our view that national Governments bear the primary responsibility for social and economic development, and for ensuring equality for women in all walks of life. Most aspects of equality for women have no direct link to international economic and financial issues."

On the basis of concern that has been expressed since the conference, it appears, unfortunately, that the last sentence of the above quotation, in particular, may have conveyed the misleading impression that the United States is somehow either not cognizant of, or insensitive to, the potentially negative impact of globalization on vulnerable groups, including women, in developing countries.

Accordingly, I should be most grateful if you would circulate the present letter and the statement transmitted herewith (see annex), which articulates more fully and clearly than our original words the United States view on globalization, as a document of the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 110.

(*Signed*) Richard C. Holbrooke

00-55033 (E) 270700

Annex to the letter dated 19 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The impact of globalization and its implications for national policy and international cooperation

The United States of America would like to expand upon the statement delivered, on 10 June 2000, at the end of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to the five-year review of efforts to implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. The United States continues to have concerns with respect to much of the language in the Beijing-plus-five outcome document that addresses globalization and debt relief, particularly in paragraphs 29, 30 *ter*, and 135 (i) (formerly 125[i](c)).

Globalization is revolutionizing the way the world works, and can bring tremendous benefits to developing countries — by stimulating trade, by generating employment, and by applying new information technology to education. At the same time, we recognize that not all developing countries have been able to take advantage of the benefits of globalization, and certainly not to the same degree. As some countries race ahead, others face the risk of falling further behind in relative terms.

Within countries, not all groups share equally in the benefits. Owing to historical and existing patterns of discrimination in many countries, some vulnerable groups, including women, have less access to these benefits, or to the proper preparation and training that will enable them to participate fully in the positive aspects of the new economy. Women lag behind men in education, technological training, access to credit, and land ownership. Owing in part to gender biases in institutions, women workers and women in business are often less able to take advantage of economic opportunities, including those enhanced through globalization.

Countries that are falling behind generally suffer from pre-existing weaknesses in policies and institutions, which, among other ill effects, retard the advancement of disadvantaged groups, including women. But the information and communications technology that comes with globalization can also benefit these disadvantaged groups, if they are allowed the freedom to learn, to participate fully in political and social life, and to seize economic opportunity.

Globalization is a fact, not a policy option. It is up to each nation to pursue policies that can help its people take advantage of the opportunities of globalization, so that all citizens, including women, will benefit. Sound national policies are the primary determinant of success in achieving the advancement of women and, indeed, in achieving overall economic and social development.

But developing countries should not face this task alone. The international community should provide encouragement and support, as appropriate, to help them build capacity and undertake the necessary reforms.